Oli aeg, asi on selles, et kaasaegsed keskpangad annavad kommertspankadele piiramatus koguses likviidsust ja ka Kreeka Keskpangale likviidsuse mitte andmiseks ei näinud mina põhjust. Seda tehti selleks, et Kreeka valitsusele survet avaldada läbirääkimistel. Nüüd on asi kohtusse antud. Euroopa Keskpank ületas sellega oma volitusi. sisuliselt võib ta meie rahandussüsteemi ka seisma panna ja seda üldse mitte sel põhjusel, et me sakslastega võla osas kokkuleppele ei jõua, vaid ükskõik, mille peale ta võib seda teha, näiteks me ei taha GMO-sid vms. EL-st on saamas neoliberaalne orjalaager.
Today Alcimos commenced proceedings before the General Court of the Court of Justice of the European Union, requesting the annulment of the decisions of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank taken, on 28 June 2015 and 6 July 2015, rejecting the Bank of Greece’s requests for increases in Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) offered to Greek banks. We have requested that the case be decided under an expedited procedure and have filed an application for interim relief seeking suspension of the ECB’s decision until the matter is decided. The text of the application can be found here.
In summary, Alcimos argues that the ECB, by rejecting the requests of the Bank of Greece, acted beyond the powers conferred upon it by virtue of paragraph 14.4 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which allows National Central Banks (NCBs) to perform functions such as extending ELA, unless the ECB Governing Council finds, by a majority of two thirds of the votes cast, that this interferes with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB. The ECB has previously accepted that ELA is granted by NCBs independently and at their full discretion to solvent credit institutions; the only constraints to a decision by an NCB to dispense ELA are any potential interference with the implementation of the single monetary policy and the prohibition on monetary financing per Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.
Indeed, if an NCB were extending credit against insufficient collateral and the recipient of ELA was not able to repay the credit in full, this would result in the NCB having created new money, thus influencing the implementation of the single monetary policy. As long as Greek banks remain solvent, the extension of ELA simply replacing deposits can have no effect on the single monetary policy; in any event, the amounts involved are trivial compared to the Eurozone’s money supply.
As regards the prohibition on monetary financing , since the ECB had already put a limit on purchases of T-bills by Greek banks as early as 24 March 2015, no breach of Article 123 TFEU could have taken place, had ELA to Greek banks been increased in line with the requests by the Greek NCB..,..