Kapitalikonto liberaliseerimine


Should Capital Controls Be Banished?

The evolution of exchange controls into an instrument of planning and control by the Nazis was a gradual one that occurred after 1933. The Nazis improved their electoral position in the fall of 1932, and Adolf Hitler became chancellor in January 1933. Exchange controls were embraced as a key component of modern economic management, and what had started out as a temporary expedient was not finally dropped until over thirty years later. Coverage was extended, with German thoroughness, to eliminate loopholes: by 1938 there were 3 laws, 50 decrees, and 500 administrative rulings concerning exchange controls, and penalties for violation were strengthened, to include even the death penalty. By the late 1930 exchange controls had become associated with Nazi Germany. Hungary also adopted exchange controls in July 1931, with a rationale similar to that in Germany; by early 1933 these had evolved into a system of multiple exchange rates. Austria adopted exchange controls in October 1931, after the depreciation of the pound sterling. However, the loopholes were numerous and compliance was lax. Therefore they were dropped de facto by the spring of 1932 after a substantial depreciation of the Austrian schilling, except for clearing agreements that had been signed with Germany, Hungary, and other countries with exchange controls so that foreign trade could continue. Other eastern European countries also adopted exchange restrictions, either for their own merit or as a defensive reaction. The adoption of general exchange restrictions (that is, covering foreign trade as well as finance) by any major market, such as Germany, compelled other countries into some form of restrictions in order to retain their export markets. The emergency capital controls of the 1930s acquired an enduring place in economic policy in many European countries for half a century.

Me teame, et natsid saavutasid täistööhõive defitsiitse kulutamisega Saksamaal.  Nad defineerisid avaliku huvi ilmselt erinevalt, kui enamus meist seda täna teeks, aga see ei ole minu jaoks eriti oluline küsimus.

Päris huvitav küsimus oleks:  kas nad eksisid oma majanduspoliitikas?

Selles mõttes, et ehk oleks kapitalikonto liberaliseerimisega nende majanduskasv palju kiirem olnud ja nad oleks võimsama sõjamasina suutnud ehitada kiiremini. Mina küll kahtlen selles. Ma muidugi ei tea ka kõiki meetmeid, mida nad kasutasid, aga fakt on, et nad ei lähtunud printsiibist: vaba kapitali liikumine parandab sakslaste heaolu ja teeb meid kõiki rikkamaks (võib olla aitab ka avalikku huvi teenida?).


Asia Times

Nazism and the German economic miracle

….After two and a half decades of economic reform toward neo-liberal market economy, China is still unable to accomplish in economic reconstruction what Nazi Germany managed in four years after coming to power, ie, full employment with a vibrant economy financed with sovereign credit without the need to export, which would challenge that of Britain, the then superpower. This is because China made the mistake of relying on foreign investment instead of using its own sovereign credit. The penalty for China is that it has to export the resultant wealth to pay for the foreign capital it did not need in the first place….

…..In four short years, Hitler’s Germany was able to turn a Germany ravaged by defeat in war and left in a state national malaise by the liberal policies of the Weimar Republic, with a bankrupt economy weighted down by heavy foreign war debt and the total unavailability of new foreign capital, into the strongest economy and military power in Europe. How did Germany do it? The centerpiece was Germany’s Work Creation Program of 1933-36, which preceded its rearmament program. Neo-liberal economists everywhere seven decades later have yet to acknowledge that employment is all that counts and living wages are the key to national prosperity. Any economic policy that does not lead to full employment is self-deceivingly counterproductive, and any policy that permits international wage arbitrage is treasonous. German economic policies between 1930 and 1932 were brutally deflationary, which showed total indifference to high unemployment, and in 1933 Hitler was elected chancellor out of the socio-economic chaos…..


About Kristjan

Defitsiidi terrorismi vastase pataljoni eriüksuslane (finantsignorantsuse vastu võitlemise osakond). Treening: MMT, postkeinsism, Tartu Ülikool Majandusteadus
Rubriigid: English, Estonian. Salvesta püsiviide oma järjehoidjasse.

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