Economist kirjutab, et eurokriis ei olnud valitsuste võlakriis. Kui see oleks olnud valitsuste võlakriis (tihti meile esitleti seda nii, et valitsused on liiga palju laenanud ja tänu distsipliini puudumisele turud ei usalda enam neid valitsusi), siis kuidas seletada seda, et praegu on mitmete kõnealuste riikide võlatase kõrgem kui siis, samuti jätkatakse defitsiitse kulutamisega. Mainstream poliitikas on sul selline luksus, et sa midagi niisugust seletama ei pea.
…..Their explanation, which strikes me as the right one, is that the euro-area crisis was not a sovereign-debt crisis. If it had been, one would have expected Belgium and Italy, which entered the crisis with extraordinarily high debts, to have landed in serious trouble. As it turned out, they made it through without troika programmes, while Ireland and Spain, which entered the crisis with low levels of sovereign debt, needed bail-outs. The problem, instead, was one of massive capital flows across borders, which encouraged high levels of private borrowing in the economies that eventually got into trouble. When the global financial crisis generated a reversal in those flows, private borrowers and banks got into big trouble. That trouble translated into serious economic downturns and bank failures, both of which led to explosive growth in sovereign debt burdens.
Exploding sovereign debt was the symptom rather than the cause of the crisis. It is worth pointing out that Europe’s current financial calm is not a result of the fact that European economies have brought down their sovereign-debt burdens. Public debt loads are bigger now than they were in 2010, not smaller. (Germany is a notable exception). And while euro-area economies have engaged in austerity, several continue to miss their budget targets. Bond yields have plummeted not because of the return of fiscal sobriety, but because the European Central Bank is buying loads of public debt and has promised to do what it takes to keep the euro-area together…..