Vitsur: börsilanguse põhjuseks pole ainult Hiina

Vitsur: börsilanguse põhjuseks pole ainult Hiina

LHV Panga majanduseksperdi Heido Vitsuri sõnul olid esmaspäevase üldise börsilanguse vallapäästjaks probleemid Hiina majanduses, samas ei saa rääkida languse puhul ainult ühest kindlast põhjusest.

Vitsur tundub arvavat, et börsihinnad on efektiivsed. Kui hinnad langevad börsidel, siis on probleemid majanduses, sest börsihinnad kajastavad majanduse seisu. Hiina kasv on endiselt hoopis teisest killast, kui Euroopas ja Ameerikas harjutud ollakse.

«Kui rääkida esmaspäevasest üldisest börsilangusest, siis selle vahetuks vallapäästjaks olid loomulikult probleemid Hiina majanduses, kuid sama selge on ka see, et ega praegusel langusel siiski ühte kindlat, isoleeritud süvapõhjust ei olnud,» kommenteeris Vitsur BNSile.

«Ükskõik, kas see meile meeldib või mitte, pole maailmamajandus möödunud finantskriisist seni veel tervenenud ning on jätkuvalt kergesti haavatav,» ütles Vitsur. «Olukorra keerukus seisneb selles, et see praegu toimib majandus üliodavate baasintresside tingimustes, kuid lõpmatuseni sellist üliodava raha poliitikat jätkata ei tohi ega saa, sest see viiks uutele mullistumistele ja ebaefektiivsusele. Raha hinda tuleb hakata tõstma,» lisas ta.

Samas võib aga raha hinna valesti ajastatud või liig suur ühekordne tõsmine tuua Vitsuri sõnul endaga kaasa uue paanika, mis muudaks majanduse normaalsetesse rööbastesse juhtimise praegusest veelgi keerulisemaks.

Aga korrektsioone on ennegi olnud, las jahtuvad need börsid. Ühtpidi on häda, et börsid kukuvad, teistpidi ka häda, kui mullistuvad. Heido Vitsur esindab kõiges neoliberaalset maailmavaadet, kus valiks alati kapitali inimeste üle. Praegu muretseb ta kapitalistide pärast, kes oma virtuaalset rikkust kaotavad börsidel.  Ja Vitsurit jääb minu mõtetes alati saatma lause: Püsib ainult valitsus, mida pangad usaldavad.

See on nii originaalne ja samas näitab hästi, kuidas riigivalitsemine ja  demokraatia toimivad inimeste arvates. Vitsur ei ole sugugi mingi kõige rumalam inimene kuskilt põhjakihtidest. Seega näitab see, mis tõeline probleem meie ühiskonnas on.

Täiesti normaalne on paljude arvates, kui valitsus väljastab litsentse mingiks äritegevuseks nagu pangandus ja siis peab hakkama sellele sektorile meele järele olema, et püsima jääda valitsusena.

The roots of MMT do not lie in Keynes

by Bill Mitchell

The roots of MMT do not lie in Keynes

….Keynes’ views in this context were relatively conservative and mistaken.

1. Issuing debt to match fiscal deficits does not reduce the inflation risk of the initial spending, whether that spending be government or non-government.

It just swaps one financial asset – a saving balance (deposit) for a government bond. Moreover, the latter carries an income flow which is likely to be larger than the former.

2. There is no reason to believe that continuous fiscal deficits will be inflationary. Extending Keynes’ own logic, deficits are required when non-government spending is insufficient to generate sales that would justify firms fully employing all available labour.

As long as firms can continue to respond to nominal demand growth through increased output growth, there is no major likelihood of an inflation breakout.

In other words, a deficit could easily be a ‘steady-state’ policy position to support full employment when the other sectoral balances (external and private domestic) were in particular states……..

….Progressives should abandon the notion that they attribute to Keynes that the fiscal balance should be zero on average over the course of the economic cycle.

In this regard, the work of Abba Lerner in the 1940s on Functional Finance is much more seminal to the development of MMT than was Keynes’ offerings, which I believe a antithetical to the foundational blocks of MMT.

Progressive narratives should aim to educate the public as to the need in normal times for continuous fiscal deficits. Then we would start getting somewhere…….

Kapitalikonto liberaliseerimine

by RICHARD N. COOPER

Should Capital Controls Be Banished?

The evolution of exchange controls into an instrument of planning and control by the Nazis was a gradual one that occurred after 1933. The Nazis improved their electoral position in the fall of 1932, and Adolf Hitler became chancellor in January 1933. Exchange controls were embraced as a key component of modern economic management, and what had started out as a temporary expedient was not finally dropped until over thirty years later. Coverage was extended, with German thoroughness, to eliminate loopholes: by 1938 there were 3 laws, 50 decrees, and 500 administrative rulings concerning exchange controls, and penalties for violation were strengthened, to include even the death penalty. By the late 1930 exchange controls had become associated with Nazi Germany. Hungary also adopted exchange controls in July 1931, with a rationale similar to that in Germany; by early 1933 these had evolved into a system of multiple exchange rates. Austria adopted exchange controls in October 1931, after the depreciation of the pound sterling. However, the loopholes were numerous and compliance was lax. Therefore they were dropped de facto by the spring of 1932 after a substantial depreciation of the Austrian schilling, except for clearing agreements that had been signed with Germany, Hungary, and other countries with exchange controls so that foreign trade could continue. Other eastern European countries also adopted exchange restrictions, either for their own merit or as a defensive reaction. The adoption of general exchange restrictions (that is, covering foreign trade as well as finance) by any major market, such as Germany, compelled other countries into some form of restrictions in order to retain their export markets. The emergency capital controls of the 1930s acquired an enduring place in economic policy in many European countries for half a century.

Me teame, et natsid saavutasid täistööhõive defitsiitse kulutamisega Saksamaal.  Nad defineerisid avaliku huvi ilmselt erinevalt, kui enamus meist seda täna teeks, aga see ei ole minu jaoks eriti oluline küsimus.

Päris huvitav küsimus oleks:  kas nad eksisid oma majanduspoliitikas?

Selles mõttes, et ehk oleks kapitalikonto liberaliseerimisega nende majanduskasv palju kiirem olnud ja nad oleks võimsama sõjamasina suutnud ehitada kiiremini. Mina küll kahtlen selles. Ma muidugi ei tea ka kõiki meetmeid, mida nad kasutasid, aga fakt on, et nad ei lähtunud printsiibist: vaba kapitali liikumine parandab sakslaste heaolu ja teeb meid kõiki rikkamaks (võib olla aitab ka avalikku huvi teenida?).

 

Asia Times

Nazism and the German economic miracle

….After two and a half decades of economic reform toward neo-liberal market economy, China is still unable to accomplish in economic reconstruction what Nazi Germany managed in four years after coming to power, ie, full employment with a vibrant economy financed with sovereign credit without the need to export, which would challenge that of Britain, the then superpower. This is because China made the mistake of relying on foreign investment instead of using its own sovereign credit. The penalty for China is that it has to export the resultant wealth to pay for the foreign capital it did not need in the first place….

…..In four short years, Hitler’s Germany was able to turn a Germany ravaged by defeat in war and left in a state national malaise by the liberal policies of the Weimar Republic, with a bankrupt economy weighted down by heavy foreign war debt and the total unavailability of new foreign capital, into the strongest economy and military power in Europe. How did Germany do it? The centerpiece was Germany’s Work Creation Program of 1933-36, which preceded its rearmament program. Neo-liberal economists everywhere seven decades later have yet to acknowledge that employment is all that counts and living wages are the key to national prosperity. Any economic policy that does not lead to full employment is self-deceivingly counterproductive, and any policy that permits international wage arbitrage is treasonous. German economic policies between 1930 and 1932 were brutally deflationary, which showed total indifference to high unemployment, and in 1933 Hitler was elected chancellor out of the socio-economic chaos…..

Venemaa töötus ajalooliselt madalaimate tasemete juures

Russian unemployment nears historic lows despite sanctions

The unemployment rate in Russia dropped in July to 5.3%, not far from the record low of 4.8% a year ago. Notably the number of the economically active population (those working or looking for a job) simultaneously grew from 76.5 to 77.2 million. This shows that real gains were made on the job market.

The unemployment rate must be considered the most accurate indicator of the real health of the economy as the other core indicators such are too much subject to estimations and conventions. Here we then have solid proof that not all is bad in the Russian economy as the press would have it.

According to some malicious and mendacious press reports the low unemployment rate is a mere chimera. The Russian government has supposedly attempted to save jobs in economically unviable areas in order to protect social stability rather in the way it was done during the planned economy in the USSR. This is what Bloomberg claims in a story of August 18 titled Putin Revives Soviet Deal of Pretend-Work-and-Pay to Hide Crisis. This comes against the better knowledge we have about a slew of announcements of downsizing and shedding of workforce at Russian state owned corporations and authorities. Indeed the Western press has been regularly gloating during the last few months over the reports of mass redundancy with headlines like these:

Russia hit with mass layoffs as economy worsens;

Russia’s Largest Carmaker Announces Major Layoffs;

Putin Cuts 110,000 Government Jobs;

Big Companies Cutting Staff in Gloomy Economy

At the end of this article, we will provide a brief digest of such press clippings for the education of those in doubt.

It becomes remarkably clear that the unemployment has gone down against the backdrop of simultaneous mass layoffs and restructuring. The only proper way to interpret this is that the Russian economy indeed is resilient and that a real modernization of Russia’s economy is underway with new viable ventures absorbing the labor force made redundant.

Bloomberg continues its lamentation (or euphoria?) about the Russian job market by referencing to a recent OECD report on labor productivity in various countries. According to that report, Russians would be the least productive workers in Europe, as The Moscow Times interprets it. This is of course total nonsense partly based on Academic drivel and partly on calculation errors. The Academic drivel part lies in the entire notion behind this measure, the idea that by dividing a country’s GDP by the number of hours worked would yield the productivity of the worker. (Let’s be fair, the question is in fact about the productivity of the economy as a whole including – and to a big degree – its management. By referring to low productivity of workers, The Moscow Times only wanted to add insult to the story.)…….

Lääne press ajab tihti jama Venemaa kohta. Venemaa SKP-st moodustab olulise osa nafta eksport. Naftahinnad langesid, mistõttu halvenesid Venemaa reaalsed kaubandustingimused ülejäänud maailmaga. Eksport lisatakse SKP-le ja import lahutatakse, kuna SKP mõõdab loodavat lisandväärtust majanduses. Venemaa jooksevkonto on ülejäägis ja mina olen veendunud, et Venemaa võiks defitsiitselt kulutada ning täistööhõive saavutada.

What is QE for the people?

hat tip to Tom Hickey at MNE

Et MMT ideed jõuavad poliitikasse üht- või teistpidi:

What is QE for the people?

Labour leadership hopeful Jeremy Corbyn has a controversial plan to boost the economy by printing money to pay for infrastructure. Would it work? Simon Wilson investigates.

What is the ‘people’s QE’?

It’s a plan for the next Labour government to reactivate the Bank of England’s (BoE) electronic printing presses (which pumped £375bn into the UK between 2009 and 2012 via quantitative easing, or QE) and boost the economy by creating money to invest in infrastructure. It’s part of what the likely next Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn, sees as a necessary “rebalancing away from finance towards the high-growth, sustainable sectors of the future”.

In his campaign presentation on the economy a few weeks ago, Corbyn suggested giving the BoE “a new mandate to upgrade our economy to invest in new large-scale housing, energy, transport and digital projects: QE for people instead of banks”. The plan is based on proposals from Corbyn’s main economic adviser, tax campaigner Richard Murphy.

It would involve setting up a new national investment bank, which would issue debt that the BoE would buy using printed money. Other bodies, such as a green investment bank, local authorities, health trusts and similar agencies, would also create and issue debt in a similar manner.

Who’s in favour?

The Financial Times’ Matthew C Klein has written a blog arguing, with caveats, that the core idea is sound. Klein argues that to date QE hasn’t proved inflationary, and that even the BoE admits most of the benefits have accrued to the wealthy, rather than wider society.

“People’s QE” – which some object to because it amounts to the government using the central bank to finance its spending – would do nothing to undermine central bank independence, as this independence is just a polite fiction.

So why hasn’t it been tried before?

Murphy suggests that this form of QE is only now being considered because “money has only recently been properly understood for the first time”. He seems to believe that advances made in the subfield of economics known as “modern monetary theory” (MMT) make people’s QE feasible. (Crudely, adherents of MMT hold that governments with the power to issue their own currencies will always be solvent, and that inflation is caused primarily by resource constraints, rather than monetary growth.)

Hõivatud

SEB: tööturg saadab vastukäivaid sõnumeid

……15-74-aastase elanikkonna tööhõive määr jõudis teises kvartalis rekordilisele tasemele, ületades 65 protsenti, kuid töötuse määr vähenes sama ajal vaid 0,1 protsendi võrra 6,5 protsendini….

….Tööhõive jõudmine majandusbuumi aegsest kõrgemale tasemele paneb küsima, kas tööturul on toimunud ka paljuräägitud struktuursed muutused ehk inimkeeli – kas töötajaid on lisandunud nendele aladele, kus palk on kõrgem ja tulevikuperspektiiv parem?….

 

Siin on  tegemist suhtelise näitajaga. Hõivatute arv oli meil kõrgem buumiaja tipus. Hõivatute arvust muidugi ei räägita ja nii jääb lugejale mulje, et oleme üliedukad ja kärpimine põhjustas kasvu. SKP kasvust räägitakse ka ju suhtelise näitajana.

Link

Tööga hõivatuid oli IV kvartalis 653 000, mis on 8000 vähem kui III kvartalis. 2007. aasta IV kvartaliga võrreldes vähenes hõivatute arv 0,2%, samas toimusid muutused hõive struktuuris. Hõive vähenemisega põllumajandus- ja tööstussektoris kaasnes teenindava sektori osatähtsuse kasv. 2008. aasta IV kvartalis töötas 64% hõivatutest teenindavas sektoris, aasta varem 60,5%. Tegevusalati vähenes kõige rohkem põllumajanduses, ehituses ja töötlevas tööstuses hõivatute arv, kõige rohkem kasvas kaubanduses töötajate arv.

2008. aasta I kvartalis tööga hõivatute arv eelmise aasta sama kvartaliga võrreldes veel kasvas, järgmistes kvartalites juba vähenes. Kokkuvõttes oli aastakeskmine hõivatute arv 2008. aastal 0,2% suurem kui aasta varem.

Link

Kui töötust iseloomustas mõõdukas vähenemistrend, siis hõivet mõõdukas kasvutrend. Hõivemäär tõusis nii 2014. aasta II kvartali kui ka käesoleva aasta I kvartaliga võrreldes enam kui 1 protsendipunkti võrra ning oli 2015. aasta II kvartalis 65,1%. Hõivatute arv kasvas hinnanguliselt 640 000-ni.

 

Sakslased alustavad Kreeka rüüstamisega

by Marketwatch

Germans begin the looting of Greece

WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) — To the victor goes the spoils.

The ink was not yet dry on the new European bailout accord for Greece before German companies started their plundering of Greek assets.

Per provisions of the “agreement” imposed on Greece, the Athens government awarded the German company that runs the Frankfurt Airport, Fraport, a concession to operate 14 regional airports, mostly on the islands like Mykonos and Santorini favored by tourists, for up to 50 years in the first privatization of government-owned assets demanded by the creditors.

The airport deal had been agreed upon last year by the previous Greek government and then suspended by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s newly elected government this year as part of his pledge to prevent the fire sale of valuable public assets at bargain-basement prices.

The airport deal gives Fraport the right to run the facilities as its own for 1.2 billion euros over the 50 years and an annual rent of 23 million euros.

Wynne Godley ja Alex Izurieta

As The Implosion Begins . . .?
Prospects and Policies for the U.S. Economy: A Strategic View

Wynne Godley and Alex Izurieta

 

For sustainable growth at an acceptable rate to take place, any further fiscal relaxation will have to be coupled with an expansion of net export demand, so that all three financial balances move toward zero. The more net export demand rises, the less the need for fiscal expansion. If net export demand were to rise so much that the balance of payments deficit reached 2 percent of GDP, and the private deficit reverted to zero, the need for further fiscal relaxation would roughly be halved, to $350 rather than $700 billion in 2006. It is difficult, in any case, to see how full employment can be maintained without the budget reverting to deficit–its normal state during the whole postwar period A substantial expansion of net export demand is easier spoken of than achieved. The classic remedy would be to bring about a dollar devaluation. However, by our reckoning, the size of the devaluation required — under the strong assumptions that world demand is unaffected and that the gesture is not neutralized by higher inflation — is very large, in the region of 20-25 percent. Unfortunately, there is no presumption whatever that market forces will automatically bring about the required adjustment in a timely way. In today’s world
of free international capital movements, devaluation of the currency has ceased to be a policy instrument in any normal or direct sense.
Another possibility is that other countries, which have so far depended on the United States through her growing external deficit to provide a locomotive force for their own economies, should be encouraged to engage in some form of coordinated reflation. Unfortunately, there exist neither the institutions nor the agreed-upon principles needed to bring such a thing about. In the very last resort, the United States should not forget that nondiscriminatory measures to control imports (not to be confused with “protectionism”) are permitted under Article 12 of the successor to the GATT.

Wynne Godley räägib isegi USA puhul impordi kontrollist. Ta ei olnud Mosleri lähenemisega nõus, et kulutame defitsiitselt ja laseme turujõududel kaubandusdefitsiidiga tegeleda(läbi valuutakursi liikumise), import on tulu ja eksport on kulu. Godley oli Kaldoriga ühes paadis selles küsimuses.

Mida ütlevad Mosler ja Wray tasakaalutuse kohta?  Nad ütlevad: Imbalance? What imbalance?  :)

 

Kaldorlane MMT kallal

Üks tüüpiline kaldorlane kirjutab nii:

Neochartalism, Original Sin And The Backfire Effect

….Now, it is clear from the above quote that Mitchell admits that nations with government have a constraint on fiscal policy. But the more troublesome fact is that he presents it as if the government doing this had some full volition to not have been indebted in foreign currency.

Incidentally Randy Wray writes a post – his latest and admits nations face a balance-of-payments problem and makes it look as if he has not shifted his extreme views:

I am not flippant about the many real constraints faced by a poor, developing nation. At an early stage of development, imports are very hard to get. The national currency faces little external demand. The world doesn’t want the nation’s produce, so it cannot export. Borrowing foreign currency can easily lead to excessive debt service and financial collapse.

Neither floating nor fixing is going to easily resolve these problems. That MMT does not have an easy solution to them does not, in my view, prove that MMT is flawed. My suspicion is that floating the currency and taking advantage of the sovereign’s ability to spend domestically is a step in the right direction. Capital controls are probably necessary—even more so if the country does not float. Foreign aid is probably necessary to finance needed imports.

[emphasis: mine]

Oh yeah doesn’t prove that the muddle which has come to be known as “modern monetary theory” is flawed? Wow!……

:)

…….

…..Now the backfire effect: in the “modern monetary theory” blogs, examples such as those of Pakistan are presented as if it was Pakistan’s policy makers huge error to have borrowed in foreign currency and to their fans this appears to strengthen the view that in the supposed world which the Neochartalists fantasize, there is no balance-of-payments constraint. And the error is the failure to recognize that “money” has an international aspect in addition to what it has to do with the government and banks.

At present, the solution is for the world leaders to provide a coordinated fiscal expansion and induce the creditor nations to increase domestic demand and hence increase latter’s level of imports. But the long term solution is to move away from a system of free trade. And that is far from the “MMT” overkill description of the world and overly simplified solutions…….

:)

Poliitikutel on kalduvus hakata uskuma omaenda väiteid

Poliitikutel on kalduvus hakata uskuma omaenda väiteid

Tänases Financial Timesis toob kolumnist Martin Sandbu oma pikemas analüüsis lugejateni argumente euroalas valitseva «raha reformide eest» mõttemalli vastu.

«Euroala poliitikud on elanud ühe müüdi najal teise järel,» tsiteerib autor endist Rahvusvahelise Valuutafondi (IMF) asedirektorit Ashoka Modyt.

Mody jätkab: «Nende müütide ümber mähkub grupimõtlemise protsess: «Me teame, et see asi ei hakka tööle, aga me peame selle asja tööle panema ning jätma mulje, et me toetame seda» – ja märkamatult hakkavad nad seda ise uskuma. Ja kuna demokraatlikku aruandekohustust pole, on nad vabad tegema ühe vea teise järel, kui majanduslikust ja poliitilisest loogikast kõneleda.»

Jätk Nicholas Kaldor ja BoP Constraint

Ma vaatasin just, et mis Bill Mitchell sellest on kirjutanud:

Modern monetary theory in an open economy

Mõned väljavõtted (jutt on arenevatest majandustest):

MMT will never lead us to conclude that a nation is “living beyond its means” and, should therefore, scale back government spending and private consumption, when there is substantial unused capacity and underutilised resources (particularly labour). In those circumstances, the nation could not possibly be living beyond its means. As a consequence the mainstream policy recommendations are always likely to worsen the situation rather than improve it.

Kristjani märkus: Kaldorlased sõidavad sulle nii sisse, et jooksevkonto defitsiit on nõudlusleke, mille tagajärjel tekib koduriigis tööpuudus. MMT taktikat rakendada ei saa, sest BoP Constraint, valuutakurss kukub, impordi nõudlus on mitteelastne. Kui valitsus vastab defitsiidiga, siis parem mõelgu, kuidas jooksevkonto defitsiiti finantseerida. IMF on viimase instantsi laenuandja.  Nad on nõus üldiselt MMT kirjeldusega operatsioonilisest reaalsusest, aga väidavad, et sellist poliitikat rakendada ei saa.

Bill Mitchell:

Further, MMT does not advocate net public spending per se. There are some growth strategies which will be unsustainable. Overall, a model of long-run growth and sustainable development requires a careful balancing of internal and external forces.

Clearly, when an economy that experiences a depletion of foreign exchange reserves has to take some hard decisions in relation to its external sector, especially if it is reliant on imported fuel and food products. In these situations, a burgeoning CAD will threaten the dwindling international currency reserves.In some cases, given the particular composition of exports and imports, currency depreciation is unlikely to resolve the CAD without additional measures.

CAD-Current Account Deficit-jooksevkonto defitsiit

Ma ei hakka siia kõike kopeerima tollest postitusest. See BoP constraint on kestnud mõnda aega kaldorlastega internetis. Bill ütleb, et poliitika peab olema disainitud nii, et stimuleeritakse nõudlust seal, kus on kodumaised tootmisvõimsused, kodumaine pakkumine. Mainstreamiga ei saa neil teemadel pea üldse arutleda, sest nad vestavad muinasjutte: intressid tõusevad valitsuse defitsiidi tagajärjel jne. Intressid tõusevad sellepärast, et keskpank tõstab neid. Ta tõstab meid tavaliselt sellepärast, et valuutakurss ei langeks. Lõpuks ei pruugi nii kõrget intressi olla, et välismaalased tahaksid koduriigi valuutas denomineeritud finantsvarasid hoida. Kaldorlaste jutt just niisugune ongi, et jooksevkonto defitsiiti peab kuidagi “finantseerima”. Kui intressid enam ei hoia ära välismaalaste tahet koduriigi valuutas denomineeritud finantsvarasid välisvaluuta vastu vahetada, siis pöördutakse IMF-i poole. Kaldorlased ütlevad nüüd, et mis te MMT-lased arvate, et te olete geeniused ja poliitikud ning keskpankurid on kõik lollid.  “jooksevkonto defitsiidiga riigid ei saa täistööhõive poliitikat rakendada. Isegi USA ei saa ja vastab sellele tööpuudusega.”

Aga miks seda jooksevkonto defitsiiti “finantseerida”, kui see nende arvates probleem on? MMT räägib nullintressidest ja see teeb välismaalastele koduriigi “finantsvarad” maitsetuks.

Et selline on minu meelest kõige tugevam argument MMT vastu.  Tee sellega, mis tahad. Midagi selles argumendis kahtlemata on.  Kui kaldorlased lugesid seda Bill Mitchelli postitust, siis kilkasid: aga eksport on kulu ja import on tulu. MMT räägib sellest, et reaalsetes terminites on eksport kulu ja import tulu. Nominaalselt või finantsiliselt on eksport tulu ja import kulu.

Paljud nende argumendid on lihtsalt valed. Näiteks väidavad nad tihti, et paljud riigid ei saa koduvaluutas laenata, seda ei finantseeritavat ära. Iga MMT-lane teab, et see pole tõsi. Valitsuse võlakirjad on riskivabad koduvaluutas denomineeritud finantsvarad ja nende järgi on alati nõudlus. Iseasi jah, et see võib viia valuutakursi kukkumiseni, inflatsioonini kaubandusdefitsiidi suurenemiseni vms, aga mitte, et ei saa väljastada võlakirju.

Bernie Sanders Is Closing Fast, But Hillary Clinton Holds Double-Digit Lead In New Poll

Bernie Sanders Is Closing Fast, But Hillary Clinton Holds Double-Digit Lead In New Poll

….In the latest poll, Clinton held a 49 to 30 advantage over Sanders. While that is still a substantial lead, it is down from her 51-22 margin from late July, and her crushing 59-19 lead from one month ago. In the past month, Clinton’s lead has gone from 40 points to 19 points nationally…..

….If current trends continue, the Democratic primary race is likely to become more competitive. While Hillary Clinton will probably remain the favorite to capture the Democratic nomination, the Sanders’ campaign appears able to put the Vermont Senator in a position where defeating Clinton is not out of the question……

MMT kriitika kaldorlastelt

Maksetasakaalutuse kriitika on minu meelest kõige relevantsem MMT aadressil. Ma räägin siin majandusteadlasest Nicholas Kaldorist ja kadorlastest. Kaldor ei ole probleem, aga kaldorlased on.

Ma kõigepealt püüan selle argumendi sisu avada. Lihtsustatud variant MMT-st on selline, et kui koduriigil tekib kaubandusdefitsiit, siis välismaalased tahavad hoida koduriigi valuutat, see on nõudlusleke, koduriigi majanduses tänu impordile nõudlus alaneb ja töökohad kaovad, valitsus peab vastama defitsiidiga, et nõudlus ja täistööhõive taastuks. Valuutakurss alaneb ning sellega hinnatakse ekspordi hind impordi hinna suhtes alla. Riik on alati konkurentsivõimeline ning saab täistööhõivet nautida.

Praktikas ei ole asi nii lihtne.  Impordi nõudlus on reeglina mitteelastne ja koduriigi valuutakursi alanedes isegi koduriigi kaubandusdefitsiit suureneb tihti (võin tuua lausa kümneid näiteid, kus see nii on juhtunud, eriti haavatavad on nn arenevad majandused).  Sellest tuleb inflatsioon, mispeale tõusevad ka ekspordi sisendite hinnad ja võib tekkida üleüldine hinnatõus lihtsalt koduriigis.

Me võime Eesti kohta ette  kujutada teoreetiliselt, et jah, me võime ju rapsiõlist kütust hakata tootma ja oma autotööstuse luua, olgugi et saame aru: sellel on oma hind.  See hind võib olla liiga ränk. Samas, kui sellistesse äärmustesse mitte minna, siis välismaalt imporditavad autod ja kütus on meile väga vajalikud ja vaevalt, et neid üldse saakski asendada kuidagi teiste hüvistega. Selline loogika, et import muutub kallimaks,säilitame täistööhõive ja tasakaalustame kaubandusbilansi, eipruugi alati justkui töötada.

Inglise keeles nimetatakse seda Balance of Payments Constraint. MMT väidab, et ujuvkursiga valitsusel sellist piirangut pole. Kaldorlased väidavad, et MMT-lased on unistajad ja ainult mõned üksikud riigid saavad nii majandust juhtida nagu MMT-lased soovitavad.

Olgu öeldud, et siin ei seisa MMT vastu peavoolu majandusteoreetikud, kes ei saa finantssüsteemi opereerimisest reeglina aru kõige elementaarsemagi tasemel või austerlased. Kaldor sai kindlasti aru, kuidas finantssüsteem opereerib ja ta toetas täistööhõive poliitikat.  Siin on Kaldorilt:

The strategy advocated in my 1965 paper “The Relative Merits of Fixed and Floating Exchange Rates” thus proved in practice futile …

… So the policy which I advocated in the 1960s and developed at greater length in my 1970 Presidential Address to the British Association, of reconciling full employment growth with equilibrium in the balance of payments through adjusting the relationship between import and export propensities by a policy of continuous manipulation of the exchange rate, proved in the event a chimera. The main reason for this was that (along with most economists) I greatly overestimated the effectiveness of the price mechanism in changing the relationship of exports to imports at any given level of income. The doctrine that exports and imports are kept in balance through induced changes in their relative prices is as old and deeply ingrained as almost any proposition in economics.

Nii palju, kui mina olen lugenud MMT-laste juttu sel teemal, siis nad saavad aru, et arenevates majandustes tuleb jälgida kaubandusdefitsiiti ja sellelevastavalt koostada poliitika, mis oleksjätkusuutlik.

Kaldorlased väidavad tihti, et ühegi riigi jooksevkonto defitsiit ei ole pikas plaanis jätkusuutlik ja sellest tekib tööpuudus koduriigis, isegi USA jooksevkonto defitsiit pole jätkusuutlik paljude arvates pikas plaanis. Nad väidavad, et netoeksportijad saavad küll valitsuse defitsiidiga täistööhõive saavutada, kuid nad lihtsalt ei tee seda.

Et nende argumendid tegelikult ei vaidle operatsioonilise reaalsuse vastu, mida MMT kirjeldab, vaid nad ütlevad, et see on mingi teine universum, mida MMT-lased kirjeldavad. Riigid ei saa niimoodi, et jooksevkonto defitsiiti ei rahastata. Nad toovad näiteks Mehhiko, aga ka hiljutise Venemaa.

Lisaks sellele on erafirmadel tihti kohustused välisvaluutas. Minu vastus viimasele oleks, et poliitika ei peaks lähtuma erafirmade riskidest või nende maandamisest, samas võivad isegi riigifirmad olla laenanud välisvaluutas. Ma ei jõua kõike selles argumentatsioonis täna siin esitada, aga loodevasti puudutan veel seda teemat tulevikus.

Modern Monetary Theory in London

NHA is very pleased to be able to present an evening with Professor Bill Mitchell, professor of economics and renowned proponent of Modern Monetary Theory, during his brief visit to the UK at the end of this month.

Come and join Professor Mitchell in conversation with Richard Murphy (Tax Research UK) and Ann Pettifor (Prime Economics), both currently economic advisors to Jeremy Corbyn’s campaign. How can the debate on the economy be reframed around the things that really matter – people and the environment? Does MMT hold the key?

This is sure to be a fascinating debate.

There will be filming taking place during this event, as part of a documentary on MMT. Please let the organisers know on arrival if you are not happy to be filmed.

Salajane kaubanduslepe

Salajase kaubandusleppe sisuga saab tutvuda vaid Brüsseli `turvaruumis`:

The Independent

TTIP controversy: Secret trade deal can only be read in secure ‘reading room’ in Brussels

The European Commission is making the secret Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) trade deal even more secret, introducing a new rule that means politicians can only view the text in a secure ‘reading room’ in Brussels.

An investigation by German news site Correct!v has revealed that the Commission is cracking down on TTIP security following a series of leaks, purportedly by EU member states who had accessed information on the deal electronically.

EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström has said that no more reports on TTIP negotiations will be sent to Member States because of “important vulnerabilities in the last rounds of negotiations”……

Mulle jääb üha enam mulje, et meil pole midagi selle vastu. Me oleme pimedalt usaldavad oma liidrite suhtes Brüsselis. Paberil on meil teoreetiliselt muidugi demokraatia.  Mina pole mingit hukkamõistu meie poliitikutelt kuulnud selle protsessi suhtes, tegelikult isegi suuremat huvi asja vastu mitte.  Ometi otsustatakse meie eest.

Kreeka primaarsed ülejäägid

Seoses Kreeka kriisi ja YV-sega levib müüt, et Varoufakis astus tagasi, sest polnud kreeditoride tingimustega nõus ning fännid mõtlevad, et oleks Varoufakis saanud oma tahtmise, siis poleks Kreekale nii hulle tingimusi peale surutud. Tegelikult oli Yanis Kreeka jaoks veelgi halvemate tingimustega nõus, kui praegu kreeditorid nõuavad.

Praegu on kreeditoridega primaarsete ülejääkide osas nõusolek:

2015:0%

2016:0,5%

2017:1%

Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis: “We will not accept a one per cent primary budget surplus”

Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis has told MPs that the country will not accept a primary budget surplus target of more than one per cent.

Read more: S&P lowers Greece’s credit rating further

The country had originally proposed a target of 0.6 per cent for 2015 – significantly below the 1.5 per cent mooted by its lenders. It then raised that to 0.75 per cent, while its creditors lowered their target to one per cent……

 

Kuidas me Hiinale ära maksame

Mõni päev tagasi kohtasin inimest, kes ütles mulle, et dollar tuhastub, kui hiinlased hakkavad võla eest dollareid nõudma.

China Slashes U.S. Debt Stake by $180 Billion, Bonds Shrug

To get a sense of how robust demand is for U.S. Treasuries, consider that China has reduced its holdings by about $180 billion and the market barely reacted.

Benchmark 10-year yields fell 0.6 percentage point even though the largest foreign holder of U.S. debt pared its stake between March 2014 and May of this year, based on the most recent data available from the Treasury Department. That’s not the doomsday scenario portrayed by those who said the size of the holdings — which peaked at $1.65 trillion in 2014 — would leave the U.S. vulnerable to China’s whims.

Instead, other sources of demand are filling the void. Regulations designed to prevent another financial crisis have caused banks and similar firms to stockpile highly rated assets. Also, mutual funds have been scooping up government debt, flush with cash from savers who are wary of stocks and want an alternative to bank deposits that pay almost nothing. It all adds up to a market in fine fettle as the Federal Reserve moves closer to raising interest rates as soon as next month…..

Why the euro is the gold standard writ large – and like the gold standard, will fail.

by Ann Pettifor

Why the euro is the gold standard writ large – and like the gold standard, will fail.

The euro not only replicated key elements of the gold standard – but went much further: European currencies were simply abolished. States lost control over both their currency and their central bank. Parallels with the operation of the gold standard explain why, like the gold standard, the euro will fail.

The euro system denies monetary policy autonomy to states, and like the gold standard, insists on full capital mobility, over-values the shared currency, creates a sense of euphoria and excess when introduced into a new state; then applies deflationary pressures on indebted states, and like the gold standard encourages nationalisms, protectionism and political resistance: the very opposite of the liberalizing motives of its architects.

Kaubandusdefitsiit

USA kaubandusdefitsiit Euroopaga lööb rekordeid

U.S. trade gap with Europe soars to record amid Greek crisis

WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) — The United States in June posted a record trade deficit in goods with the European Union, a sign of the sharp divergence in fortunes between the two regions.

The overall U.S. trade deficit, which includes services, climbed 7.1% to a seasonally adjusted $43.8 billion in June, the government said Wednesday. The upturn largely reflected an all-time high in imports such as autos, drugs and commercial aircraft from Europe, whose goods are cheaper to buy because of a weakened currency…..

Itaalia nõuab eurotsooni poliitilist liitu

Itaalia nõuab eurotsooni poliitilist liitu

Itaalia rahandusminister esines üleskutsega liikuda euroalaga «otseteed poliitilise liidu suunas»: see olevat ainus viis, kuidas ühisraha ellu jääb.

«[Mõne liikme] väljumine ja seega [liikmelisuse] pöördumatuse lõpp on nüüd laual. Ärgem petkem iseennast,» ütles Pier Carlo Padoan. «Kui tahame kõrvaldada riski, peame tekitama teistsuguse euro – tugevama euro.»

«Mõned usuvad, et praegune asjade korraldus on enam-vähem okei, kui natuke putitada,» ütles minister Financial Timesile. «Mina arvan, et sellest ei piisa.»……

Saksamaa tõrjus teated peatsest euroala maksust

Saksa rahandusministeeriumi teatel on ajakirjanduses avaldatud lugu peatselt tekkivatest euroala maksudest eksitav, kuna esiteks tuleks muuta Euroopa Liidu leppeid.

Nimelt kirjutas ajakiri Spiegel, et rahandusminister Wolfgang Schäuble on valmis loobuma Saksa maksusüsteemist ning minema euroala eelarve teed. Ühtlasi olevat Schäuble avatud euroala rahandusministri ametiposti suhtes, kes korjaks «euromaksu», vahendab Bloomberg Business.

«Euroala eraldi eelarve loomine pikemas perspektiivis on osa viie presidendi raportist, mis puudutab Euroopa Liidu edasiarendamist,»  selgitas rahandusministeerium. «Arutelud selle üle alles algavad.»

«Viis presidenti» on Mario Draghi (Euroopa Keskpank), Jean-Claude Juncker (Euroopa Komisjon), Donald Tusk (Euroopa Liit), Martin Schultz (Euroopa Parlament) ja Jeroen Dijsselbloem (rahandusministrite eurogrupp). Kvintett avaldas oma raporti Euroopa ühteliitmiseks vajalikest sammudest juunikuus…….

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